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Neuroeconomics aims at providing a detailed 
computational and neurobiological account of 
the decision-making process that will serve as a 
foundation for a better understanding of human 
behavior and well-being (Fehr and Rangel 
2011). This means that data such as neural activ-
ity, response times (RT), and eye movements 
play an important role in this research program. 
However, much opposition to neuroeconomics 
has centered on the idea that standard economic 
theory makes no predictions about non-choice 
data. This stems from a long-held reluctance 
among economists to model the process of 
 decision-making and to instead focus only on its 
outcome, namely the resulting choice. To address 
this, recent neuroeconomic models have sought 
to demonstrate the usefulness of jointly relat-
ing choice frequencies and process measures to 
underlying latent valuations. Here we show, in 
particular, that (i) neuroeconomic  drift-diffusion 
models (DDMs) yield new—empirically vali-
dated—insights into the potential suboptimali-
ties of individual decision-making that can be 
mitigated with novel policy interventions, and (ii) that the time it takes to make decisions pro-
vides an informative signal about people’s pref-
erences. Thus, additional measures related to the 
choice process can be useful for both positive 
and normative economics. Overall, we use the 
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DDM to make a general point that there is sub-
stantial value to jointly modeling choices and 
other process measures, even if a researcher is 
only concerned with choices.
The problem that the DDM addresses is that 
of stochastic choice. Inconsistent choice behav-
ior is well documented and necessitates the 
use of probabilistic approaches such as logis-
tic choice models (Luce 1959), random utility 
theory (McFadden 1973), and quantal response 
equilibria (McKelvey and Palfrey 1995). Some 
have argued that such probabilistic behavior 
is still utility-maximizing behavior and that 
it only appears noisy due to unobserved char-
acteristics of the alternatives or the decision 
maker (McFadden 1973). Others have instead 
argued that it is the result of a Bayesian-like 
process (such as a DDM), where individuals 
must compare noisy internal representations of 
the attractiveness of the options (Busemeyer 
1985), which may lead to choice mistakes. On 
the basis of choice data alone it is not possible to 
distinguish between these two explanations, but 
unlike random utility theory, the DDM correctly 
predicts additional observables such as RTs, 
which would seem to give it a distinct advantage 
in the debate.
Here we discuss some positive and norma-
tive implications of the DDM. First, we briefly 
introduce the DDM, which will be the theoreti-
cal basis for our empirical applications. Second, 
we show that subjects misallocate their time and 
miss out on high-stakes choices by getting stuck 
on low-stakes ones. To prove this point, we 
introduce a simple intervention that improves 
their performance. Third, we show that with the 
DDM approach it is possible to predict subjects’ 
indifference points using only their RTs.
I. Drift-Diffusion Model of Choice
While the DDM and other related models 
are relatively unknown in economics, they have 
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been widely used in perception research, where 
the decision maker must observe explicitly sto-
chastic evidence (e.g., a screen full of flicker-
ing dots) and make an objective judgment about 
the state of the world (e.g., some of the dots are 
moving to the left or right). It has been shown 
countless times that the DDM is able to cap-
ture accuracy rates and RT distributions in these 
tasks.
In economics, choice options are usually 
not explicitly stochastic in nature. However, 
stochasticity arises when assessing the deci-
sion utility of the choice options, due to noise 
in how our brains represent them. When decid-
ing between two possible choice options X and 
Y, the decision maker observes value signals 
 x t  and  y t randomly drawn from two distributions 
with means  u x and  u y respectively. One can think 
of  u x and  u y as the “true” underlying values of 
the choice options. After observing a pair of 
signals at time t, the decision maker updates his 
relative decision value (RDV), which we denote 
V t . One can think of  V t as akin to a Bayesian 
 posterior that option X is preferred to option 
Y. The temporal evolution of the RDV can be 
 written as
(1)  V t =  V t−1 + d ( x t −  y t ) ,
where d is a parameter that governs the drift rate 
at which the RDV evolves.
Assuming that the signals are being drawn 
from normal distributions, we can rewrite the 
model as
(2)  V t =  V t−1 + d ( u x −  u y ) +  ε t ,
with ε ~ N(0,  σ 2 ), where σ is a second param-
eter governing the noise in the process.
The sampling process continues until the RDV 
reaches a pre-defined choice threshold of ±a. 
A value of +a indicates a choice for option X, 
while a value of −a indicates a choice for option 
Y. One can think of the choice threshold as a pre-
defined confidence level that the decision maker 
requires before committing to his choice. Notice 
that because the RDV lacks units, we are free to 
let either d, a, or σ be equal to 1. What is impor-
tant to note is that these parameters are assumed 
to be set by the decision maker beforehand (or 
are a property of the neural decision circuitry) 
and thus do not change across trials, though they 
may vary across conditions or experiments.
One can see from the model that the time it 
takes to make a decision depends critically on |  u x −  u y |. When this difference is large, the 
RDV evolves with a steep expected slope and 
decisions are made quickly, whereas when the 
difference is small, the RDV evolves with a 
shallow expected slope and decisions are slow (Figure 1). At indifference, choices are driven 
purely by noise.
This model is appealing both theoretically 
and empirically. The DDM is known to imple-
ment the sequential probability ratio test, which 
in environments where  |  u x −  u y | is fixed, is 
the optimal decision rule in the sense that for a 
desired accuracy rate, it minimizes the expected 
time to reach a decision (Wald and Wolfowitz 
1948). Empirically, although this assumption 
is often violated, the model has been very suc-
cessful at capturing a wide variety of decisions. 
Furthermore, the threshold-based decision rule 
in the model mimics the way the brain actually 
works. Neurons (including the ones that encode 
decision values and cause decisions) transmit 
information using all-or-nothing signals known 
as “action potentials,” which only occur once 
the inputs to the neurons reach a critical thresh-
old of activity. The strength of evidence is thus 
encoded in the frequency of action potentials, 
known as the “firing rate.”
For economic decisions, Krajbich, Rangel, 
and colleagues have shown that the DDM, and 
the extended multi-option version, accurately 
capture choice probabilities and RTs of sub-
jects making binary and trinary food choices (Figure 2), consumer purchasing decisions, 
and temporal discounting decisions (Krajbich, 
Armel, and Rangel 2010; Krajbich and Rangel 
Figure 1. The Drift-Diffusion Model
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2011; Krajbich et al. 2012). In several of these 
studies visual attention was also incorporated 
into the DDM and it was shown that there is a 
reliable correspondence between gaze time and 
choices. More specifically, options that receive 
more attention also receive more evidence in 
their favor and so eye-tracking data can be used 
to improve choice predictions.
In a more recent paper (Krajbich et al. 2014), 
we demonstrated that the model could predict 
new subjects’ behavior in three different social-
preference tasks without any parameter fitting, 
i.e., using previously-estimated parameters from 
the food-choice experiments (Figure 2).
Taken together, these results provide strong 
evidence that the DDM is capturing a general 
choice process for economic decisions. The 
DDM thus holds great promise as a way to unify 
the currently divergent approaches to model-
ing preferences over risk, time, social alloca-
tions, etc. Furthermore, as we will discuss in the 
next two sections, its ability to predict behavior 
across tasks, subjects, and environments is just 
one benefit of the DDM.
II. The Opportunity Cost of Time
One important finding from the DDM 
approach is that decision makers spend more 
time on choices where  |  u x −  u y | is small, com-
pared to large. This is economically counterin-
tuitive if time is a sufficiently valuable resource. 
If a decision maker is nearly indifferent between 
two choice options then she should just flip a coin 
and use her valuable time for other purposes.
The DDM explanation for this phenomenon 
is that people do not know  |  u x −  u y | and so do 
not realize how close they are to indifference. 
A common assumption in these models is that 
decision makers do not know the value of the 
RDV, only whether it has reached a threshold 
or not. This is analogous to how neurons will 
fire only once a threshold of activity is reached. 
Otherwise there is no way to know how close to 
threshold the neuron is. Similarly, the  decision 
maker does not know whether she is on the 
verge of reaching a decision, or no closer than 
when she started (Ratcliff 2006).
To study the suboptimal use of time implied 
by the DDM, we devised an experiment where 
the opportunity cost of time was under our con-
trol (Oud et al. 2014). In the experiment, subjects 
made 100 incentivized binary choices between 
different snack foods for which we had previ-
ously measured their willingness-to-pay (WTP). 
We constructed 50 “high stakes” and 50 “low 
stakes” trials with large and small differences 
in WTP, which were shown in a pseudo-random 
sequence. Subjects only had 150 seconds total (with 1.25 second pauses between trials) and no 
subject was able to complete all 100 choices. 
Subjects knew that any unreached choices would 
be made randomly.
Given the clear opportunity cost of time, opti-
mal decision makers should quickly decide on 
Figure 2. Simultaneous Choice and Response Time 
(RT) Predictions of a DDM with the Same Parameters 
in Binary Food Choice (top) and Dictator-Game 
Experiments (bottom)
Notes: Choice probabilities and RTs are plotted on the left 
and right vertical axes, respectively, with choice probabili-
ties in black circles and RTs in gray triangles. Data are pre-
sented as points with standard error bars across subjects, 
while DDM predictions are presented as dashed lines.
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the low-stakes trials to ensure they reach more 
of the high-stakes ones. Instead we see the oppo-
site. Subjects took an average of 1.65 s on the 
low-stakes trials, while taking only 1.11 s on the 
high-stakes ones. This came at a substantial cost 
to the subjects, as they missed out on an average 
of 44 trials, equal to an average of $20.10 left on 
the table per subject if all the trials had been paid 
out (assuming $1 = 1 Swiss franc).
To further demonstrate suboptimality, in a fol-
low-up task with the same subjects, we attempted 
to improve their welfare, as measured by choice 
surplus (defined as the mean-subtracted differ-
ence in WTP between the chosen option and the 
worst option on the screen), by creating an inter-
vention where they were prompted to “Choose 
Now” if they spent too long on a choice. If they 
did not make a choice within half a second of 
seeing that message, the choice was randomly 
made for them, and the experiment continued 
with a new choice pair. Since RT increases 
with proximity to indifference, the intervention 
should primarily cut off the low-stakes trials, 
thus allowing subjects to reach more high-stakes 
trials. Critically, the intervention mechanism 
used only  decision-time information and did 
not use any information about the WTPs for the 
items. Thus we only used information that was 
also available to the subjects.
We found that indeed this intervention sub-
stantially improved subjects’ choice surplus in 
the experiment. Interestingly, the intervention 
also had some spillover effects. Subjects mark-
edly improved in non-intervention blocks (alter-
nated with intervention blocks), but only after 
experiencing the intervention (Figure 3).
With this simple experiment we have shown 
that people are suboptimal on at least two  levels. 
First, our results are consistent with the view 
that people must construct their preferences at 
the time of choice and that low-stakes choices 
take more time than high-stakes ones. Still, 
it was possible that people could be using an 
optimal decision rule, conditional on the neu-
ral constraints of the preference-construction 
process, by, for example, cutting off long deci-
sions. We have shown that this is not the case, 
since our subjects sub-optimally allocated their 
valuable time and were unable or unwilling 
to cut themselves off when decisions took too 
long. Had they been responding optimally to the 
time-constraints, we should not have been able 
to improve their performance on the task, using 
no additional information. It is also informa-
tive that subjects’ performance improved in 
post-intervention blocks that lacked the inter-
vention, implying that the intervention helped 
subjects to adjust their behavior in a benefi-
cial way. Overall, we see this experiment as 
a  proof-of-concept that it may be possible to 
improve peoples’ welfare with simple interven-
tions or behavioral training.
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Figure 3. Results From The Time-Intervention Study, 
with Mean RT as a Function of the Difference in WTP 
between the Two Food Items (top) and Individually 
 De-Meaned Choice Surplus in the Different Choice 
Blocks (bottom)
Note: “First” denotes the first choice block (N = 49), “pre” 
denotes non-intervention blocks preceding the first inter-
vention block (N =29), “intervention” denotes the interven-
tion blocks (N = 49), and “post” denotes non-intervention 
blocks occurring after the first intervention block (N = 49).
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III. Using RTs to Predict Choices
Given that choices are probabilistic, it can 
often be time-consuming and difficult to estab-
lish an individual’s preferences, since in most 
applications, we use only choice outcomes as 
the basis for inference. However, the DDM sug-
gests that we should be able to do better by addi-
tionally utilizing RTs.
To investigate this possibility, we looked at 
an existing Ultimatum Game dataset from our 
laboratory (Baumgartner et al. 2011). In this 
experiment, each subject played 16 rounds of 
the Ultimatum Game in the responder role. Each 
trial, the subject received an offer of $4, $6, 
$8, or $10 out of a possible $20 from anony-
mous, randomly re-matched partners. The sub-
ject could either accept the offer, or reject it and 
leave both players with $0. Consistent with the 
DDM, 89 percent (16 out of 18) of the subjects 
made probabilistic choices in the sense that the 
same offer (from different anonymous partners) 
was both rejected and accepted in different trials.
In this experiment the DDM also predicts that 
the transition from accepting to rejecting offers 
will coincide with the longest RTs. To test this 
prediction, we examined how many subjects had 
their highest mean RT at the offer level closest to 
their indifference point (i.e., 50 percent accep-
tance rate). With only 3–5 choices per offer 
level, this basic DDM prediction was borne out 
in 16/18 of our subjects (Figure 4).
Figure 4 also demonstrates another use of the 
DDM. The bottom two subjects accepted every 
offer above $4 and so if we had data for only 
those offer levels (such limitations often apply 
in small datasets) we would be unable to say 
whether these subjects gave any consideration to 
the fairness of the offers before accepting them. 
Yet looking at the RT curves there is clear evi-
dence that these subjects found it more difficult 
to accept offers of $6 compared to $8, and so we 
would correctly conclude that these subjects did 
care about the fairness of the offers and extrapo-
late that they would reject low enough offers.
More generally, the DDM suggests that RTs 
can be used to measure the strength of prefer-
ence (Clithero and Rangel 2014; Chabris et al. 
2009). As an example, suppose we observe an 
individual express a preference for A over B 
in 2 seconds, and A over C in 1 second. Using 
standard revealed preference theory, we could 
not make a prediction about the preference 
 relation between B and C. On the other hand, 
the DDM makes a very clear prediction. The 
fact that A over B was a slower decision than A 
over C directly implies that B is likely closer in 
value to A. Thus the DDM predicts that B will 
likely be chosen over C. In this way, the DDM 
can predict future decisions for which revealed-
preference theory alone makes no prediction. 
This example illustrates how analyzing RTs can 
enable researchers to more efficiently estimate 
preferences from a limited number of observed 
choices.
IV. Conclusions
We conclude by noting that neuroeconomic 
models such as the DDM provide strong ties 
between traditional choice behavior and non-
choice measures such as RT, attention, and brain 
activity. Here we have demonstrated how one 
such measure, RT, can be used to inform both 
positive and normative economics. Importantly, 
RTs can often be collected at no cost and so it is 
wasteful to not make use of them.
Of course, more research is necessary to inves-
tigate the boundaries of where these  models can 
be usefully employed. For example,  predictions 
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Figure 4. Choices and RTs for Four Subjects in the 
Ultimatum Game, Showing that Peak RTs Coincide 
with Choice Frequencies that are Closest to 
Indifference
Notes: Choice probabilities (black circles) and RTs (gray 
lines) are plotted on the left and right vertical axes, respec-
tively. The dashed line indicates indifference between 
accepting and rejecting.
MAY 2014506 AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS
of the DDM are likely to be less accurate in 
strategic environments. In such settings it often 
requires time to determine how actions map into 
outcomes and/or identify optimal strategies (Rubinstein 2013). The DDM we’ve presented 
is not a model of puzzle solving or of explicit 
calculation, but rather a model that captures 
choices that depend only on one’s own subjec-
tive preferences.
We should also note that the model described 
here is a rather simple version of the DDM. This 
simplicity entails a cost, namely that this particu-
lar form of the DDM will not always be the best 
fitting model on any particular dataset. However, 
we have found that our formulation of the model 
provides a good balance between simplicity and 
accuracy and is thus a useful predictive tool.
We find it particularly promising and excit-
ing that the DDM is able to incorporate atten-
tion to predict behavior across different choice 
environments. These results address important 
concerns about the ability of neuroeconomics to 
provide useful alternatives to existing models of 
economic behavior, and they give us hope that 
we may be able to replace the current array of 
behavioral models with a more unified approach 
toward decision-making. This work thus invites 
new research into the scope of the model and 
what factors influence its key parameters.
REFERENCES
Baumgartner, Thomas, Daria Knoch, Philine 
Hotz, Christoph Eisenegger, and Ernst Fehr. 
2011. “Dorsolateral and Ventromedial Pre-
frontal Cortex Orchestrate Normative Choice.” 
Nature Neuroscience 14: 1468–74.
Busemeyer, Jerome R. 1985. “Decision Making 
Under Uncertainty: A Comparison of Simple 
Scalability, Fixed-Sample, and Sequential-
Sampling Models.” Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cogni-
tion 11 (3): 538–64. 
Chabris, Christopher F., Carrie L. Morris, Dmi-
try Taubinsky, David Laibson, and Jonathon 
P. Schuldt. 2009. “The Allocation of Time in 
Decision-Making.” Journal of the European 
Economic Association 7 (2-3): 628–37.
Clithero, John A., and Antonio Rangel. 2014. 
“Combining Response Times and Choice Data 
Using a Neuroeconomic Model of the  Decision 
Process Improves Out-of-Sample Predictions.” 
Unpublished. 
Fehr, Ernst, and Antonio Rangel. 2011. “Neuro-
economic Foundations of Economic Choice––
Recent Advances.” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 25 (4): 3–30. 
Krajbich, Ian, Carrie Armel, and Antonio Rangel. 
2010. “Visual Fixations and the Computation 
and Comparison of Value in Simple Choice.” 
Nature Neuroscience 13: 1292–98. 
Krajbich, Ian, Todd Hare, Bjoern Bartling, Yosuke 
Morishima, and Ernst Fehr. 2014. “A Com-
mon Mechanism Underlying Food Choice and 
Social Decisions.” Unpublished.
Krajbich, Ian, Dingchao Lu, Colin Camerer, and 
Antonio Rangel. 2012. “The Attentional Drift-
Diffusion Model Extends to Simple Purchas-
ing Decisions.” Frontiers in Psychology 3 (193): 1–18.
Krajbich, Ian, and Antonio Rangel. 2011. “Mul-
tialternative Drift-Diffusion Model Predicts 
the Relationship Between Visual Fixations and 
Choice in Value-Based Decisions.” Proceed-
ings of the National Academy of Sciences 108 (33): 13852–857. 
Luce, R. Duncan. 1959. “On the Possible Psycho-
physical Laws.” Psychological Review 66 (2): 
81–95. 
McFadden, Daniel. 1973. “Conditional Logit 
Analysis of Qualitative Choice Behavior.” 
In Frontiers in Econometrics, edited by Paul 
Zarembka, 105–42. New York: Academic 
Press. 
McKelvey, Richard D., and Thomas R. Palfrey. 
1995. “Quantal Response Equilibria for Nor-
mal Form Games.” Games and Economic 
Behavior 10 (1): 6–38. 
Oud, Bastiaan, Ian Krajbich, Kevin Miller, Jin 
Hyun Cheong, Matthew Botvinick, and Ernst 
Fehr. 2014. “Irrational Deliberation in Deci-
sion Making.” Unpublished.
Ratcliff, Roger. 2006. “Modeling Response Sig-
nal and Response Time Data.” Cognitive Psy-
chology 53 (3): 195–237. 
Rubinstein, Ariel. 2013. “Response Time and 
Decision Making: An Experimental Study.” 
Judgment and Decision Making 8 (5): 540–51. 
Wald, A., and J. Wolfowitz. 1948. “Optimum 
Character of the Sequential Probability Ratio 
Test.” Annals of Mathematical Statistics 19 (3): 326–39.
